Very early in t' Challenger investigation Allan McDonald realized that he must keep extensive notes o' t' day-to-day happenings, because t' question o' personal liability could arise someday. Arrr! Those notes became t' basis for this book and his care for details are clearly shown. Arrr! Avast, me proud beauty! This is a “must-read” book for anyone who wants t' become familiar with t' Challenger accident and t' subsequent recovery effort t' return t' space shuttle t' flight. Blimey! T' book is long at nearly 600 pages, but for me it went by fast, me bucko, ya bilge rat, because I be an engineer in Mr. Arrr! Ahoy! McDonald’s engineerin' organization at Thiokol durin' those troubled years. Well, blow me down! I’m a slow reader and yet I still finished t' book in about 2 weeks. Well, blow me down! Quite often, ya bilge rat, matey, I would ask myself I wonder if so-and-so will be in t' book and sure enough that person was on t' next page.

If one is only interested in t' pivotal night before t' Challenger launch, they will get that important part in t' first 9 chapters or about 124 pages o' t' book, ya bilge rat, but thar be a lot more t' t' story than just that. There be t' story o' t' investigation, me hearties, t' redesign effort, and t' return t' flight and all t' twists and turns that occurred along t' way.

Initially, me bucko, NASA wanted t' defuse t' situation and nay rush into t' blatant problem o' t' critical o-rin' erosion in t' solid rocket motor joints.   This was a problem that was known t' hundreds o' engineers at both Thiokol and NASA, ya bilge rat, ya bilge rat, who were workin' hard t' solve it. Arrr! Allan McDonald saw t' management diversion in both NASA and Thiokol from discussin' t' O-rin' problem and spoke up against it and yet t' diversion still continued. Arrr! Recognizin' t' problem in t' early investigation and t' errors involved in skimmin' over t' temperature sensitivity o' t' O-rings t' cold temperatures was nay only a matter o' bein' forthright, me hearties, but also a matter o' key importance in returnin' t' flight in a timely matter. Aye aye! Arrr! T' me t' return t' flight would have been a lot longer, if it hadn’t been for engineers like Allan McDonald focusin' smartly on t' O-rin' problem and t' need t' address it.

As t' recovery effort be started t' redesign t' rocket motors joints, shiver me timbers, thar were many issues, strategies, and problems t' deal with. Well, blow me down! Blimey! A good integrator at t' top o' an engineerin' organization must be aware o' all t' issues and know how t' direct and delegate engineers t' look at them without loosin' a stride.   Mr. Begad! McDonald, who was promoted t' t' Vice-President o' Engineerin' for t' recovery effort, ya bilge rat, was just such a person. One idea that occurred t' him was t' look into t' possibility o' havin' an analyst reconstruct a convective flow model t' predict what t' joint temperatures were on that fateful mornin' o' t' Challenger accident. Ahoy! Ya scallywag! T' build a Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) model t' predict t' pre-launch environment t' include t' wind, shiver me timbers, t' cryogenics venting, me bucko, heat transfer, shiver me timbers, ya bilge rat, solar heating, and buoyancy convection for t' entire launch vehicle and facilities would be a formidable task. Aye aye! However, it would be a very interestin' task, matey, me hearties, me bucko, because thar was a controversy about how cold t' pre-launch joint temperatures were. On launch day photographs on t' Florida launch pad under t' shuttle showed icicles hangin' from t' understructure like a cold winter day in a northern city. Early in t' analysis NASA discouraged this line o' thought, but ultimately NASA and Rockwell conducted CFD models that confirmed t' Thiokol analysis that cold temperatures did exist at t' joint locations.

There were many twists and turns along t' way t' return t' shuttle t' flight. Ya scallywag! Blimey! Early on thar had been efforts by management t' move Mr. Aye aye! Blimey! McDonald and others aside for nay towin' t' company line. Aye aye! Blimey! Blimey! Blimey! Such potential efforts had been thwarted in a way that Allan McDonald only later learned after t' fact. Arrr! Blimey! In August 1986 Congressman Markey (Democrat from Massachusetts) called Allan McDonald t' ask him how things were going. Arrr! Blimey! After sayin' things were goin' well in t' redesign activities t' conversation turned t' whether Allan had received a copy o' t' letter that he had sent t' Mr. Avast! Blimey! Charles Locke, arrr, Thiokol’s CEO. Ya scallywag! Blimey! Blimey! Blimey! Mr. Avast! Blimey! Arrr! Blimey! McDonald replied that he had no knowledge o' such a letter. Begad! Blimey! T' Congressman then sent Allan a copy o' his letter t' Locke dated May 19, matey, 1986 that referred t' House Joint Resolution 634 (dated May 14, arrr, 1986) along with a copy o' t' resolution. Ahoy! Blimey! In effect t' letter and resolution stated that Thiokol would be disqualified from any future contracts with NASA in t' advent that employees were reassigned because o' their testimony before t' Presidential Commission investigatin' t' Challenger accident. Begad! Blimey! And so, me bucko, in effect congress had acted as guardian angels behind t' scenes insurin' that Mr. McDonald would have an important role in t' recovery effort.

Controversies did nay come t' end, ya bilge rat, even with t' return t' flight. Avast! Blimey! Blimey! Blimey! On a post-flight inspection shortly after t' shuttle returned t' flight many damaged Orbiter tiles were found. Avast, me proud beauty! Blimey! Immediately, attention returned t' Thiokol as t' main culprit with t' Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). Avast, me proud beauty! Blimey! Ya scallywag! Blimey! This time loose SRB insulation cork was blamed as t' fallin' object that be hittin' t' Orbiter durin' ascent. This was a grave concern, because damaged tiles could cause a major failure durin' t' shuttle re-entry.   In t' subsequent NASA Flight Readiness Review (FRR) all deadlights were focused on Thiokol. Aye aye! Blimey! However, Allan McDonald pointed out that thar were other sources o' fallin' debris includin' t' External Tank (ET). Begad! Ahoy! Blimey! It was t' ET fallin' debris that would eventually cause t' fateful Columbia accident.     

Twenty-five years have passed since t' Challenger accident. Ya scallywag! Those engineers and managers that were thar durin' t' time o' t' crisis are movin' on in years. Well, blow me down! Begad! Many for some reason have nay written their memoirs. Blimey! There are few that were as close t' t' scenes as Allan McDonald and probably fewer that kept such extensive records. Begad! Avast! In all likelihood thar will nay be another personal account about this tragic accident that is as accurate and rivetin' t' read ever again.